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The effects of regionalism on trade have been extensively evaluated within a gravity 
model framework. With the expected exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
European Union (EU), the prospect of regional disintegration has brought about a new 
impetus to studying trade policy effects. Using actual and forecast data for a panel of 
bilateral imports between the EU15 and the rest of the world, this paper examines the 
trade effects of EU economic integration agreements (EIAs), their evolution over time 
and the related counterfactual Brexit trade policy scenarios. Distinct trade effects are 
obtained for the EU trade related agreements; positive, significant and of similar 
magnitude for the EU and free trade agreement (FTA) coefficients, but negative and 
significant (and smaller in magnitude) for the regional economic partnership agreements 
(EPAs). The subperiod results suggest the positive coefficients of EU and FTA 
membership tend to diminish over time, implying earlier membership of EIAs came with 
greater trade benefits. Finally, in generating the predicted values for the trade effects of 
three alternative counterfactual Brexit scenarios (hard Brexit, hard Brexit plus, global 
Britain), the findings suggest an asymmetric effect depending on the perspective of the 
UK versus the EU. Whereas the UK’s trade would decline substantially with all three 
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EU Economic Integration Agreements, Brexit and Trade  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) since the 1990s has prompted 
much interest in studying the trade effects of regional integration. According to the WTO 
(2018), some 287 RTAs are in force (as of 1 May 2018), corresponding to 459 
notifications from World Trade Organisation (WTO) members. Studies of the trade 
effects of economic integration agreements (EIAs) most commonly include regional 
integration in Europe, mainly because the European Union (EU) represents the deepest 
and most durable RTA worldwide and its succession of enlargements provides the basis 
for continual study (Greenaway and Milner 2002).   
Most studies of regional integration in Europe find a small, positive and 
significant effect of RTAs on trade although a neutral or even a negative effect also 
feature among the empirical findings. Using the gravity model framework, early studies 
tend to use cross sectional methods or a series of cross sections to assess the importance 
of regional integration whereas panel methods dominate more recent studies. Aitken 
(1973), for example, estimate the gravity model as a cross section for each year over the 
period 1951-1967; the trade effects for the dummy variables denoting the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are 
found to be consistent with theoretical predictions. In other words, the trade preference 
coefficients are initially negative and insignificant in the preintegration period, change 
sign during the integration phase and increase in magnitude with the progression of time, 
eventually becoming positive and significant. Continuing with the theme of estimating 
the trade effects of the EEC and EFTA dummies among the industrialised countries, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) analyse successive cross sections for the later period, 
1956-1992, to identify differences over time in the trade creating and trade diverting 
effects of European regionalism. The effect of European regional integration has also 
been examined across a range of panel estimators (Bussière et al. 2005; Stack 2009) 
while Cheng and Wall (2005) extend the sample size to consider the trade effects of 
additional regional blocks.  
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The trend of EU enlargement, however, is set to reverse with the contraction of 
EU membership to 27 countries as a consequence of the June 2016 referendum to 
withdraw the UK from the EU.1 Not surprisingly, the unprecedented withdrawal of a 
large country from the world’s largest trading block has prompted much empirical 
interest.2 
Much of the existing literature on estimating the trade consequences of Britain’s 
exit from the EU (ie Brexit) relies on the World Input Output Database (WIOD), see, for 
example, Van Reenen 2016; Brakman et al. 2018; Dhingra et al. 2017; Felbermayr et al. 
2018. In effect, the data facilitate a quantitative trade model of the global economy, 
allowing for the channels through which trade affects consumers, firms and workers, 
thereby providing a map from trade to welfare analysis (Van Reenen 2016).3 In other 
strands of the literature, Kee and Nicita (2017) construct an overall trade restrictiveness 
index of the UK’s major trading partners to analyse the short term effects of Brexit on 
goods trade. For a selection of EU and non EU trading partner countries, Douch et al. 
(2018) use a synthetic control method to analyse the effects of Brexit on UK bilateral 
trade. Various post Brexit trade policy scenarios have also been quantified using bilateral 
trade data that is inherent to the gravity model framework (HM Treasury 2016; Oberhofer 
and Pfaffermayr 2018).4 
 
1 Formally, the UK was expected to leave the EU on 29 March 2019, two years after the British 
government triggered Article 50, notifying the EU of its intention to end EU membership. Since then, the 
UK and the EU have negotiated three extensions: initially for two weeks (until 10 April 2019) and then for 
six months (until 31 October 2019) to allow the UK Parliament to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement. The 
latest extension (until 31 January 2020) was triggered by the Benn Act, which required the Prime Minister 
to seek a further extension if a deal was not agreed by 19 October 2019. Note that the analysis is conducted 
to coincide with the original planned exit date.  
2 Although the EU has experienced territorial reductions with the exit of Algeria in 1962 upon 
independence and the exit of Greenland in 1985, no country has previously terminated EU membership.  
3 Note that the WIOD data comprise mostly developed countries only. Among the drawbacks of WIOD, 
Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2018) note that the limited time variation of policy indicators makes it difficult 
to identify the causal effects of RTAs. 
4 Taking a broader perspective, Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) go beyond the effects of Brexit on trade to 
analyse the near term and longer term effects of Brexit on the wider economy, including trade, foreign 
direct investment, immigration and skills. 
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For a comprehensive panel dataset of bilateral imports between the 15 established 
member countries of the EU and the rest of the world, this paper examines the trade 
effects of EU economic integration agreements (EIAs), their evolution over time and the 
related counterfactual trade policy scenarios arising post Brexit.  
Three distinguishing features characterise this paper. First, in contrast to the 
existing literature that tend to use a smaller sample of countries and hence a more limited 
number of EU trade related agreements, the trade effects for the full listing of EU EIAs 
are estimated. Specifically, EU EIAs comprise membership of the EU, an economic and 
political partnership between 28 countries; various trade related agreements including 
customs unions, free trade agreements (FTAs), association agreements and stabilisation 
agreements with 38 countries; and the more recently formed (and ongoing negotiation of) 
trade and development economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with 28 countries (see 
the Appendix Table A1 for the full list of EU EIAs).5 
Second, on the assumption that export growth projections for the trading partner 
countries apply equally across all the EU15 countries, forecast values are calculated for 
bilateral imports over the period 2017-2022. In essence, the sample period includes actual 
data (1960-2016) and forecast data (2017-2022). The benefits of forward looking data are 
twofold. First, it allows for estimation of the trade effects of economic integration 
associated with recently formed trade agreements, for example, the trade agreement 
between the EU and Canada that came into effect in September 2017. Second, the trade 
effects of economic disintegration associated with the planned exit of the UK from the 
EU can also be estimated. In other words, the potential trade effects of Brexit coincide 
with the planned date of departure in contrast to the existing literature that conduct 
counterfactual trade policy scenarios on time scales before Brexit actually occurs. 
Third, using the gravity model framework, the analysis is undertaken controlling 
for two potential sources of endogeneity bias, namely omitted variable bias and 
simultaneity bias. In estimating the gravity model specification as a 2SLS regression with 
country fixed effects, the possibility that trade and EIAs are simultaneously determined – 
an issue often overlooked in the empirical literature – is taken into account. Specifically, 
geographic variables, namely joint land area and joint continents, are used as instrumental 
 
5 See Limão (2016) for an in depth review of the effects of preferential trade agreements.  
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variables in the 2SLS regression to represent the potentially endogenous EU trade related 
agreements. 
The findings confirm the trade enhancing effect of economic integration. Distinct 
trade effects, however, are obtained when the EU trade related agreements are split 
according to the type of arrangement: positive, significant and of similar magnitude for 
EU membership and the FTAs, but negative and significant (and smaller in magnitude) 
for the regional EPAs. The mixed results for the trade policy effects largely depend on 
the degree of liberalisation and the concomitant reduction of tariff and non tariff barriers. 
Furthermore, the subperiod results suggest the positive coefficients of EU and 
FTA membership tend to diminish over time, implying earlier membership of EIAs came 
with greater trade benefits associated with the ‘four freedoms’ of the Single Market. After 
the fallout of the global financial crisis, its aftermath and the debt crisis in Europe, the 
forecast subperiod suggests a rebound in the trade effect of EU membership. 
Finally, in generating the predicted values for the trade effects of three alternative 
counterfactual Brexit scenarios (hard Brexit, hard Brexit plus, global Britain), the 
findings suggest the UK’s trade with all three country groups (the EU, the FTAs and 
regional EPAs) would decline substantially, approximately by one third. On the other 
hand, trade with the rest of the world would rise by nearly a half. In aggregate, UK 
bilateral trade with all countries would decline by 6 per cent and 13 per cent under the 
hard Brexit and the hard Brexit plus scenarios respectively, but these losses would be 
partially offset by the global Britain strategy (5 per cent). The global Britain strategy, 
however, comes with major caveats. From the EU’s perspective, only minor percentage 
changes in bilateral trade are predicted under all three scenarios, suggesting an 
asymmetry of effect.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the gravity 
model specification of bilateral trade and the estimation strategy. The data definitions and 
sources are provided in Section 3. The results in Section 4 are split between the gravity 
model estimates quantifying the trade effects of EU economic integration agreements, 
robustness checks, the evolution of EU EIA trade effects over time and the related 
counterfactual trade policy scenarios arising post Brexit. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
2.1 The gravity model  
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where tijTRADE  refers to bilateral trade between countries i  and j  over a given time 
period t ; tiGDP  and 
t
jGDP  capture the economic size for both countries and ijDIST  is 
the geographic distance between their capital cities. Equation (1) also includes a vector of 
time invariant explanatory variables, ijZ ; a vector of time varying variables, 
t
ijX ; and the 
random error term, tij .  
To capture the main determining factors of trade between the established EU15 
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where the natural logarithm ( ln ) of 
t
ijIMPORTS  are bilateral imports into the 15 
established member countries of the EU (countries i ) from the rest of the world 
(countries j ) over the time period t , 1960 to 2022; and GDP per capita is stated in 






ij GDPPCGDPPCDGDPPC lnln −= , as a measure of relative factor endowments.  
In its basic form, the standard gravity equation posits that bilateral trade increases 
with national income and declines with the distance between them. Anderson (1979) was 
the first to provide theoretical underpinnings for the gravity model using the properties of 
the expenditure equation of tradable goods whereby the origin country’s GDP is a proxy 
for the production of traded goods and the destination country’s GDP is a proxy for 
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expenditure on traded goods. The derived gravity model also captured transport costs, 
hence GDP and distance, ijDIST , should be positively and negatively signed respectively. 
In the augmented version of the gravity model, Bergstrand (1989) identifies 
separate roles for GDP and GDP per capita by amalgamating the factor proportions 
theory (primarily a supply oriented theory), and the demand based theory of similarity of 
demand characteristics within a Heckscher–Ohlin–Chamberlain–Linder framework. As 
an indirect way of testing the Linder (1961) hypothesis, Gruber and Vernon (1970) merge 
the separate roles of income per capita into the per capita income differential, 
t
ijDGDPPC . A negative coefficient, suggesting trade is positively related to consumers 
with similar per capita incomes and therefore having similar consumption patterns, 
indicates support for the Linder hypothesis. In contrast, a positive coefficient suggests 
trade is driven more by differing per capita incomes consistent with the Heckscher–Ohlin 
model (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933) of relative factor abundance.  
The vector of time invariant bilateral factors, ijZ , includes four binary coded 
dummy variables denoting adjacent borders, ijADJ , and landlocked countries, ijLOCK , 
as indicators for geographic proximity; historical colonial linkages, ijCOL , as an 
indicator for institutional proximity, and a common ethnic language, ijLANG , as an 
indicator for cultural proximity. While commonalities between countries should boost 
trade, landlocked countries tend to be disadvantaged in trade terms because the overland 
costs of transporting goods are generally higher than shipping costs. 
The vector of time varying explanatory variables, 
t
ijX , is represented by the log of 
infrastructure, tijINFRAS , and EU economic integration agreements, 
t
ijEIA . The inclusion 
of infrastructure in a model of trade stems from Bougheas et al. (1999), who suggested 
that the level of infrastructure can affect trade via its influence on transport costs. They 
argue that transport costs are not only a function of distance, but also depend on the 
availability of public infrastructure such as roads, ports and telecommunication networks. 
Therefore, they augment the gravity model with direct measures of transport 
infrastructure, including the length of the motorway network. As trade depends inversely 
on transport costs and transport costs depend inversely on infrastructure, a positive 
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relationship between the level of infrastructure and the volume of trade is predicted. 
Along these lines, Francois and Manchin (2013) assess the trade effect of both physical 
(air transport and roads) and communications infrastructure while Carrère (2006) 
quantifies the trade effect of infrastructure by constructing an index based on four 
variables (road density, roads paved, railways and telephone lines). Accordingly, 
equation (2) includes two measures of physical infrastructure, namely the log of the 
summed value of air freight, tijAIRln , and similarly for rail lines, 
t
ijRAILln . While the 
former is important in transporting high value, small volume products such as 
pharmaceuticals and technology overseas, the latter – critical to the Industrial Revolution 
and the development of export economies – remains an important mode of transporting 
bulk and manufactured goods overland. 
To capture the potential beneficial trade effects of EU economic integration 
agreements, tijEIA , three binary coded dummies are constructed.
6 First, a dummy variable 
denoting EU membership between 28 countries, tj
t
i EUEU − , is used to capture European 
intraregional integration. The expected positive trade effect of EU membership stems 
mainly from the deposed trade and nontrade barriers initiated under the programme to 
complete the single market. Indeed, the Internal Market programme brought about the 
mutual reduction and removal of several trade obstacles including substantial progress 
towards dismantling technical barriers to trade; the liberalisation of public procurement; 
and the development of simplified internal customs and fiscal controls (European 
Commission 1996).   
Second, a dummy denoting membership of various trade related agreements 
including customs unions, free trade agreements, association agreements and stabilisation 
agreements between the EU and 38 countries, tj
t
i FTAEU − , are associated with the main 
aims of reducing or removing customs tariffs in bilateral trade. 





i EPAEU − , is constructed between the EU and 28 African, Caribbean and 
 
6 In a similar vein, Vicard (2009) separately estimates the trade effects of RTAs according to four broad 
categories: preferential arrangements, free trade agreements, customs unions and common markets. 
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Pacific (ACP) countries. In essence, the EPAs are trade and development partnerships 
with the main aims of providing duty free and quota free (DFQF) access to the EU 
market; fostering trade related cooperation; and promoting sustainable development 
through investment. These reciprocal regional EPAs are compatible with World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules and replace the unilateral preferences previously granted by 
the EU to many ACP countries under the Sugar Protocol.7 A summary of the EU trade 
related agreements is provided in the Appendix (Table A1).  
2.2 Estimation strategy  
Since its inception in the 1960s, the gravity model of trade has been traditionally 
estimated as a cross sectional regression (or for a series of cross sections when the 
evolution of trade is of interest) and, more recently, using panel estimators. 
2.2.1 Omitted variables  
Many of the empirical findings, however, are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias 
arising from the omission of trade cost variables that can differ depending on location. 
Three main approaches have been adopted in the literature. First, cross country variation 
in trade costs have been proxied by international differences in aggregate price indexes, 
for example, an exchange rate index, an export unit value index or the GDP deflator 
(Bergstrand 1989). This approach, however, entails a degree of arbitrary selection of 
price indexes without necessarily eliminating the omitted variable bias problem.  
Second, to account for all those factors that impede bilateral trade, Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) compute multilateral price terms capturing bilateral trade costs 
 
7 The origin of trade preferences for the ACP countries goes back to the Treaty of Rome with a 
commitment to the prosperity of European (mostly French) colonies. After gaining independence, 
preferential treatment offered by six European countries to 19 (mostly African) former colonies was 
enshrined in the Yaoundé Conventions signed in 1963 and 1969 (Persson 2008). With the accession of the 
UK into the European Community (EC) in 1973, the preferences of British former colonies were 
accommodated by replacing Yaoundé with the Lomé Convention and expanding European-African 
cooperation to the Caribbean and Pacific countries (see, for example, Stack et al. 2018 on the trade effects 
of ACP preferential treatment). 
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relative to all other trading partner countries. Modifying model (1) to allow for 
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where −1iP  and 
−1
jP  are the multilateral resistance terms for both countries, which 
replace the aggregate price indexes; and   is the elasticity of substitution between all 
goods.  
Last, drawing on the gravity model specification by Mátyás (1997), Feenstra 
(2002) advocates the use of country fixed effects in preference to calculating complex 
price terms. As trade costs are often not directly observable or are difficult to measure, 
this approach has the advantage of generating unbiased coefficient estimates in the 
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where the price terms are now represented by fixed effects for both countries, i  and j , 
respectively. In essence, the inclusion of country fixed effects helps control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries.  
 With the additional dimensions of panel datasets, solving the omitted variable bias 
problem has emerged in the form of how to control correctly for heterogeneity across 
countries (Baltagi et al. 2003; Cheng and Wall 2005; Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Stack 
2009). Many studies have included bilateral fixed effects to control for unobserved time 
invariant heterogeneity (see, for example, Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Bergstrand et al. 
2015). These studies have additionally included country time fixed effects to account for 
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time varying exporter and importer multilateral heterogeneity. Indeed, the generalised 
gravity model for a panel (with both cross sectional and time dimensions) should include 
(time invariant) bilateral dummies, ij , to capture the omission of trade determinants 
across country pairs and time varying country dummies, ti  and 
t
j , to capture the 
variation of multilateral resistance over time (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006), where time 
specific effects, t , are interacted with the country fixed effects.  
The generalised gravity model, however, is problematic in so far as greater data 
availability and larger panel datasets can incur an excessive number of fixed effects. 
Moreover, the time invariant variables, ijZ , are subsumed into the country pair dummies 
and hence cannot be estimated directly. Similarly, the effects of GDP are largely captured 
by the time varying country dummies. Indeed, the issue of dimensionality can 
compromise the analysis of any variable of interest if it shares the same dimension as the 
fixed effects. Taken together, the inclusion of country pair dummies and time varying 
country dummies imply the core gravity variables of GDP and distance can no longer be 
estimated directly.  
2.2.2 Simultaneity  
While the inclusion of fixed effects helps control for one source of endogeneity (ie 
unobserved heterogeneity), it says little about endogeneity arising from a different source 
(ie simultaneity).8 Endogeneity bias can also arise from the simultaneous determination 
of the dependent variable and one or more of the explanatory variables. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004) have previously highlighted the possibility of dual causality between 
RTAs and trade. In other words, the causality between RTAs and trade need not 
necessarily be unidirectional; the formation of RTAs can stem from or lead to higher 
trade flows.   
To control for possible endogeneity arising from reverse causality, the model can 
be estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS) whereby one or more instrumental 
 
8 An explanatory variable is endogenous if it is correlated with the equation’s error term. According to 
Wooldridge (2002), endogeneity usually arises in one of three ways: omitted variables, simultaneity and 
measurement error.  
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variables (IVs) are needed to replace RTAs, the potentially endogenous variable. There is 
no consensus, however, on what constitutes good instruments for RTAs in a trade 
equation. Magee (2003), for example, includes a joint democracy dummy variable and 
several economic variables as instruments for PTAs in a 2SLS panel regression of trade. 
For a large cross section of countries, Egger et al. (2011) generate IV estimates using 
historical and political dummy variables as instruments, namely, former colonies, former 
common colonisers and countries that were formerly part of the same country. 
As instruments for the EU trade related agreements, the value of unity for the 
respective EIA dummies is replaced with geographic variables, namely joint land area 
and joint continents. These geographic variables are candidate instruments for EIAs on 
the grounds that the process of EU enlargement and the formation of trade related 
agreements with other countries have expanded free trade coverage to large tracts of land 
area, including much of the European continent and beyond. Indeed, the EU has 
negotiated trade deals with countries from all continents of the world (Africa, the 
Americas, Asia, Europe and the Pacific).  
In the context of this study, good instruments should satisfy two requirements: 
first, they should have no direct effect on trade, and second, they should have a direct 
effect on the formation of RTAs. As the existing literature does not usually include these 
types of geographic variables in the gravity model, it is not unreasonable to treat them as 
excludable from the trade equation. On the other hand, a strong association between 
geography and PTAs have previously been noted. For example, the WTO (2011) point 
out that only half of all RTAs are from the same region. Lake and Yildiz (2016) also 
highlight the importance of geographic characteristics in the choice of PTAs. Indeed, 
simple correlations suggest these geographic variables may well play an important role in 
explaining RTAs.9 
By combining instrumental variables estimation with panel data methods, the 
parameters can be estimated consistently in the presence of unobserved (fixed) effects 
and endogeneity of the time varying explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2014). In short, 
 
9 The (simple) correlation between the instruments and the EU EIAs (merged into a single dummy) is 
relatively high (0.54 and 0.93) compared with the correlation between the instruments and imports 
respectively (0.21 and 0.32). 
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estimating the gravity model specification (2) as a 2SLS regression with time and country 
fixed effects draws on a combination of theoretical developments (Anderson 1979; 
Bergstrand 1989; Bougheas et al. 1999; Anderson and van Wincoop 2003) and helps 
control for two sources of endogeneity bias, namely unobserved heterogeneity (Mátyás 
1997; Feenstra 2002) and simultaneity (Baier and Bergstrand 2004). In addition to 
controlling for two sources of endogeneity, the relative simplicity and ease of 
implementation in software are among the main benefits of this approach compared with 
other methods adopted in the literature.10 
3. DATA 
The panel data set consists of bilateral imports11 into the 15 established member countries 
of the EU12 from the rest of the world13 over the 1960-2022 period. The sample period 
includes actual data (1960-2016) and forecast data (2017-2022), the latter able to account 
for the trade effects of economic integration associated with recently formed trade 
agreements as well as economic disintegration associated with the planned exit of the UK 
from the EU. 
The data definitions and sources are as follows. Bilateral imports (cost, insurance, 
freight) over the 1960-2016 period, in US dollars, are sourced from the Direction of 
Trade Statistics (DOTS), International Monetary Fund (IMF 2017). For the years 2017-
2022, data projections for trade growth are taken from the World Economic Outlook 
Database (WEO), IMF (2018a). Note that bilateral imports are calculated on the 
 
10 For example, in splitting the sample into a control period and a treatment period, the use of a synthetic 
matching algorithm is required for the synthetic control method (Douch et al. 2017). Anderson et al.’s 
(2015) three step estimation procedure to obtaining estimates of the general equilibrium effects of trade 
policy is also much more involved than the approach of this study.  
11 Bilateral import data are used in preference to bilateral export data because of greater susceptibility to 
trade policy changes. Import data also tend to be more reliable because governments have an incentive to 
track information on imports as it constitutes a tax base (Francois and Manchin 2013).  
12 Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
13 The country coverage is based on the 193 countries included in the IMF’s WEO database.  
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assumption that export growth projections for the partner countries apply equally across 
all the EU15 trading partners.14 
Data on GDP and GDP per capita, in current US dollars, for the years 1980-2022 
are from the WEO,15 supplemented with pre 1980 data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank (2017).  
Also sourced from the WDI are the infrastructure related variables, namely the 
freight of air transport, in million tonnes per kilometre, and rail lines, total routes per 
kilometre, with forecast data generated using 2000-2016 period averages.  
The geographic distance between two capital cities, in kilometres, is obtained 
from CEPII (2018) and similarly for the dummy variables denoting an adjacent border, 
landlocked countries, a common colonial history and a common ethnic language.  
The EIA dummies are constructed based on information from the European 
Commission (2018) and the World Trade Organisation (2018). In essence, the binary 
coded EIA dummies switch from zero to one when a given trade deal comes into force. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Gravity model results  
Table 1 presents the results for the gravity model of import determinants between the 
EU15 countries and the rest of the world over the period 1980 to 2022.16 Column (1) 
 
14 Take, for example, Poland. For the years 2017-2022, the WEO export growth forecast values (in 
percentage terms) are 7.5, 7.1, 6.6, 6.1, 5.7 and 5.3 respectively. Therefore, assuming trade growth rises 
equally across all the EU15 countries, the forecast bilateral import values for 2017 will be 7.5 per cent 
higher than actual bilateral import values for 2016, which in turn, for 2018 will be 7.1 per cent higher than 
the bilateral import values for 2017 and so forth.  
15 The IMF’s WEO data projections of selected macroeconomic data evolve according to economic 
developments and policies in individual countries, developments in international financial markets as well 
as the global economic system (IMF 2018b). Therefore, the forecast data taken from the WEO’s April 2018 
edition will have incorporated downward revisions in lieu of the June 2016 referendum (and the 2014-2015 
global slowdown), but will not have included the effects of more recent events such as the US-China trade 
war and the global Covid-19 pandemic.  
16 Note that the number of observations is reduced by the inclusion of the infrastructure variables in the 
model (data for air freight and rail lines are available from 1970 and 1980 onwards respectively). 
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shows the results using least squares estimation with time and country fixed effects, the 
latter accounting for (unobservable) variation of characteristics across countries. Column 
(2) shows the corresponding results estimated using 2SLS.17 In columns (1) and (2), all 
EU trade related agreements are merged into a single EIA indicator capturing trade 
relations with 94 countries while in columns (3) and (4), the EIA indicator is split into 
three separate dummies according to EU membership between 28 countries; various trade 
related agreements including customs unions, free trade agreements, association 
agreements and stabilisation agreements with 38 countries; and membership of a full or 
interim EPA with 28 ACP countries. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Note that the goodness of fit (
2R ) is satisfactory across the estimators, with the 
independent variables explaining four fifths of the variance of the dependent variable. 
The null hypothesis that the EIA dummies are exogenous is rejected by both the robust 
chi squared ( 2 ) score test and the robust regression F test (Wooldridge 1995), 
confirming the endogeneity of EIAs and thereby indicating the suitability of instrumental 
variables regression. The relatively high values for the first stage partial R2 statistics 
suggest high explanatory power of the instruments. In other words, the instruments are 
strongly correlated with the endogenous EIA dummies – after netting out the effects of 
the exogenous variables. The test of overidentifying restrictions (Wooldridge 1995), 
however, rejects the null hypothesis of valid instruments. More specifically, the 
significant chi squared (
2 ) score test statistic suggests that at least one of the 
instruments may be correlated with the structural error term. In general, finding good 
instruments that satisfy the twin requirements that the instruments be correlated with the 
endogenous variable, but uncorrelated with the dependent variable is challenging. 
The results shown in Table 1 suggest the model coefficient signs are broadly in 
line with theoretical priors. Specifically, the positive and significant coefficients for GDP 
 
17 Anderson et al. (2015) suggest the country fixed effects should be time varying for panel data, but this 
would entail a large number of dummies while collinearity with the instruments would mean that the 2SLS 
equation would no longer be identified. Therefore, time specific effects that control for common shocks – 
such as the global financial crisis and the more recent 2014-2015 general slowdown – are included in the 
model instead. 
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suggest larger countries tend to trade more while the per capita income difference 
coefficients are aligned with the Linder hypothesis in so far as factor endowments are 
sufficiently similar between the two groups of countries.  
Higher transport costs, however, reduce the volume of trade, as indicated by the 
distance coefficients. The trade impeding effects associated with the geographic 
characteristics of landlocked countries and adjacent land borders are also apparent. The 
lack of access to the sea for landlocked countries tends to raise transport costs. Similarly, 
national boundaries can increase trade related costs, contractual obligations and time in 
transit by imposing import tariffs, declarations in terms of the origin of goods as well as 
border checks and delays.   
In contrast, a shared colonial history and a common language significantly 
increase bilateral trade. In other words, a mutual linguistic or cultural heritage – often 
arising from past colonial linkages – contribute to current trade patterns because 
familiarity with foreign customs and norms help lower transaction costs and payment 
frictions associated with trade.18 Both measures of physical infrastructure (air freight and 
rail lines) also enhance trade. 
Of particular interest are the distinct trade effects of the EIA dummies. Overall, 
the single EIA dummy coefficient confirms the trade enhancing effect of economic 
integration (column 2).19 Splitting the EIA indicator according to the type of 
arrangement, however, yields nonuniform trade effects: positive, significant and of 
similar magnitude for EU membership and the FTAs, but negative and significant (and 
smaller in magnitude) for the regional EPAs. 
The recent timing in the formation (and ongoing negotiation) help explain why 
the regional EPAs do not yet have a positive effect on bilateral imports. Other 
contributing factors may include the tendency towards exporting a narrow range of 
commodity types to the EU, for example, sugar, coffee, fish, tobacco, copper and crude 
oil from the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries as well as various country 
 
18 Language is defined as a country’s ethnic language spoken by at least 9 per cent of a country’s 
population. The results are also robust to the use of the official or national language. 
19 In percentage terms, the effect of the EIA dummy on imports is 46 per cent, calculated as: 
]1001)38.0[exp( − . 
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characteristics such as the mostly small island countries that make up the CARIFORUM 
EPA or the many African countries with greater scope for prospective (rather than 
realised) trade and development potential.  
Note that controlling for simultaneity brings about a relatively small increase in 
the coefficient magnitude of the overall EU– EIA dummy (column 2) and the EU–FTA 
dummy (column 4) when compared with controlling for heterogeneity alone, otherwise 
the model coefficients are similar. Baier and Bergstand (2007) have previously 
highlighted the possibility of simultaneity bias arising from the EIA coefficient estimates, 
although they suggest that such bias is more important for a cross sectional gravity 
equation rather than for a panel.  
4.2 Robustness checks 
Several robustness tests are undertaken to check the sensitivity of the results. First, to test 
whether the results are sensitive to the measure of overland transport infrastructure, the 
summed value of rail lines is replaced with the corresponding value of road density, 
t
ijROADln , (ie the length of a country’s road network per 100 square kilometres of land 
area), sourced from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2018). Second, to 
check the sensitivity of the results across different subgroups of countries, the model is 
reestimated for two subsamples, the first comprising intraEU trade between the 28 EU 
member countries and the second involving the 94 countries for which the EU has a trade 
related agreement. Third, the model is reestimated using an alternative estimator, namely 
the 2 way (bilateral) fixed effects model, which accounts for heterogeneity in a cross 
sectional dimension. To control for possible endogeneity of GDP, the 2SLS regression is 
also rerun with the lag of GDP as an instrument. 
The results for the robustness checks are shown in Table 2. For ease of 
comparison, the 2SLS benchmark specification is shown in column (1). Column (2) 
shows the trade effect of road density. Columns (3) and (4) show the subsample results. 
In column (5), the 2SLS estimates additionally control for GDP endogeneity and in 
column (6), the results are shown when controlling for cross sectional heterogeneity. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Across the range of sensitivity checks, the coefficient estimates for the EIA 
dummies are broadly robust, although the EU–EPA dummy coefficient loses significance 
when the model includes road density (column 2) or is estimated using the standard fixed 
effects estimator (column 6). There is also some variation in the magnitude and 
significance of the remaining model coefficients, especially for the EU subsample of 
countries (column 3). In particular, the change in the coefficient sign for adjacency 
highlights the beneficial trade effects of open borders within the EU countries in contrast 
to the larger sample of countries. Similarly, landlocked countries are no longer 
geographically disadvantaged20 – and even become significantly advantaged when 
connected by a good network of roads (column 2). Taken together, the importance of 
roads (column 2) and the relegation of rail lines to insignificance for the EU subsample 
(column 3) is not surprising in so far as roads account for over 70 per cent of all inland 
transport modes in the EU, quadrupling the share transported by rail (European 
Commission 2017).21 Ethnic language, however, becomes negative and significant, 
reflecting the diversity of cultures among this more narrowly defined group of countries. 
4.3 Evolution of EIA effects 
It is also interesting to consider the evolution of the EIA effects on trade. In other words, 
to determine if there are any discernible differences in the EIA coefficients over time, the 
model is reestimated for five subperiods. The subperiod results are shown in Table 3. In 
columns (1) and (5), the full sample period is split between actual data (1960-2016) and 
forecast data (2017-2022) respectively; in columns (2) to (4), the actual data are split into 
consecutively shorter and more recent periods, capturing different eras of major global 
shocks. 
While the first subperiod (1960-2016) includes the 1960s, a period of growth and 
tranquillity during the post World War II expansion, during the 1970s of the second 
subperiod (1973-2016) the world economy was propelled into two major oil price crises. 
 
20 Located in the heart of Europe are five landlocked countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia. 
21 The inclusion of road density in the model substantially reduces the number of observations (data are 
available for the years 1990-2011 only), hence rail lines is used as the preferred measure of a country’s 
internal transport network in the main results. 
 19 
During the third subperiod (1989-2016), the late 1980s ushered in an economic downturn 
affecting much of the western world. During the fourth and most recent subperiod (2007-
2016), the global financial crisis and the ensuing debt crisis plunged the world economy 
into its worst recession since the 1930s. This phase also includes a general slowdown in 
2014-2015 linked to China’s decelerating growth and falling commodity prices. The June 
2016 referendum to withdraw the UK from the EU also occurred during this time frame 
with potentially far reaching consequences into the future. Looking ahead, the final 
subperiod (2017-2022) based on forecast data is helpful towards analysing the trade 
effects of economic integration associated with recently formed trade agreements as well 
as economic disintegration associated with the planned exit of the UK from the EU.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The subperiod results suggest the positive coefficients of EU and FTA 
membership tend to diminish over time. In other words, earlier membership of EIAs 
came with greater trade benefits, helped by the signing of the 1986 Single European Act 
that created the Single Market, culminating in the ‘four freedoms’ relating to goods, 
services, people and money across EU borders. Indeed, by the fourth subperiod the 
beneficial effects of EIA membership have dwindled away into insignificance, likely 
reflecting the fallout of the global financial crisis, its aftermath and the debt crisis in 
Europe, all of which brought about sharply declining growth of GDP and lower demand 
for imports. The forecast subperiod, however, suggests a rebound in the trade effect of 
EU membership, probably linked to the growing importance of intra industry trade and 
the exchange of similar, but differentiated goods, as suggested by the rising magnitude of 
the GDP per capita difference coefficient. In contrast, the prospective trade effects of 
FTAs and the regional EPAs are subdued and even adversarial. 
In terms of the remaining model variables, the subperiod results suggest that 
similarity of per capita incomes in accordance with the Linder hypothesis more recently 
supersedes GDP in explaining EU import patterns, while transport costs remain broadly 
stable, as suggested by the distance coefficient. The downside of land borders decreases 
into insignificance in contrast to landlocked countries, which face substantial constraints 
in the forecast subperiod. The gains from colonial linkages have weakened since the 
1960s, when many countries gained independence, consistent with the findings of Head 
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et al. (2010). Similarly, the effects of cultural heritage have eroded over time. Finally, the 
coefficients for infrastructure are broadly stable, except for the fourth subperiod when 
belt tightening during the financial crisis favoured cheaper transport modes, including 
railways, over the speedier, but more costly mode of air transport. As the economy 
recovers from the financial crisis, the logistics industry looks set to return to the more 
normal mix of transport modes.  
4.4 Counterfactual predictions 
The predicted values for alternative counterfactual trade policy scenarios are also 
generated. A typical counterfactual comparative static exercise using the gravity model 
involves hypothetically changing some bilateral friction (for example, the removal of a 
tariff) and calculating the effects on trade flows (Anderson et al. 2015). Following the 
burgeoning Brexit related literature, the counterfactual change in the dependent variable 
is estimated by hypothetically altering the values for the RTA indicator (Brakman et al. 
2018; Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr 2018). 
On this basis, the trade effects of three alternative counterfactual scenarios are 
estimated by changing the values for the single EIA indicator capturing bilateral trade 
relations. First, under the ‘hard Brexit’ scenario, the EIA indicator is set to zero for all 
UK EU bilateral trading pairs from 2019 onwards, indicating a change in trade relations 
with the EU countries only. If there is no trade agreement in place with the EU post 
Brexit, the UK faces the prospect of trading with the EU under WTO rules, implying 
tariffs on vehicles, pharmaceuticals and most agricultural products.22  
Second, the ‘hard Brexit plus’ scenario assumes UK trade relations with the FTA 
and EPA countries are additionally affected, ending free trade with over 60 more 
countries. After Brexit, inheriting the EU’s various free trade deals with third countries is 
not automatically guaranteed. Outside the EU, the UK’s negotiating position will be 
weaker and will likely require an offer of more favourable terms of trade – for countries 
 
22 After Brexit, setting new terms of its own with the WTO would be an arduous process involving 
approval by the other 163 WTO members. As an alternative, all tariffs and quotas in place under existing 
terms of EU membership could be eliminated, but would be opposed by various sectors including farming 
and manufacturing.  
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with either existing or prospective trade deals with the EU (see the Appendix Table A2 
for the list of EU agreements pending and under negotiation). 
Last, with a hard Brexit offering the freedom to strike its own deals with the rest 
of the world, the ‘global Britain’ scenario assumes the UK can trade freely with all other 
countries upon leaving the EU. This might entail a prized trade deal with the US, the 
UK’s biggest trading partner (by exports), as well as trade deals with populous countries 
such as China and India in line with the UK’s recent trends of rising trade shares with 
emerging and developing countries set against a general decrease in its trade shares with 
the EU (see the Appendix Table A3). 
In practical terms, the three Brexit dummies are modelled by switching the values 
for the UK bilateral trading relations from 2019 onwards: from one to zero with the EU 
countries under the ‘hard Brexit’ scenario; from one to zero with the EU, FTA and EPA 
countries under the ‘hard Brexit plus’ scenario; and from zero to one with all other 
countries (nearly 100 countries in the sample) under the ‘global Britain’ scenario, where 
the ‘global Britain’ scenario inherently assumes a hard Brexit plus scenario. Calculating 
the trade effects of the three alternative counterfactual scenarios amounts to comparing 
the predicted values of each scenario with the predicted values of the benchmark ‘no 
Brexit’ scenario.23 
Table 4a shows the predicted counterfactual values associated with the three 
Brexit scenarios and the corresponding percentage change in bilateral imports, averaged 
over the post Brexit years, 1919-2022, and across four country groups (the EU member 
countries; countries partaking in various trade related agreements including customs 
unions, FTAs, association agreements and stabilisation agreements; countries belonging 
to trade and development EPAs; as well as countries for which there is no trade 
agreement with the EU ie the rest of the world (ROW). Bilateral relations with all 
countries in the sample are shown in the last column. Panel A shows the estimates for 
bilateral UK relations and Panel B shows the corresponding estimates for bilateral EU 
relations.  
 
23 As the predicted values generated from the benchmark and Brexit scenarios are derived from the WEO’s 
data projections, the effects of the various Brexit scenarios intrinsically depend on the data projections and 
their associated assumptions. 
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[Insert Table 4a here] 
Under all three scenarios, the findings suggest the UK’s trade with the EU would 
decline by up to one third (column 1). Under the hard Brexit plus and global Britain 
scenarios, trade with the FTA and EPA country groups would fall by a similar magnitude 
(columns 2 and 3). A hard Brexit, however, brings opportunities to trade with the rest of 
the world, which would rise by nearly a half (column 4). In fact, UK bilateral trade in 
aggregate could increase by over 5 per cent (column 5), implying the benefits of a global 
Britain strategy would go a long way towards offsetting the losses of a hard Brexit (–6.02 
per cent), although falling far short of lost trade with all countries for which it currently 
has a trade deal (–12.80 per cent). From the EU’s perspective, only minor percentage 
changes in bilateral trade are predicted under all three scenarios (Panel B), suggesting an 
asymmetry of effect.  
The findings are broadly consistent with the empirical Brexit literature, which use 
different data sources (such as the WIOD); different time frames (usually conducted in 
advance of the actual withdrawal date); and different methodologies (such as the fixed 
effects approach by HM Treasury 2016 or Anderson et al.’s (2015) approach to 
estimating general equilibrium trade policy effects used by Brakman et al. 2018 and 
Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr 2018). The estimates for the global Britain scenario, however, 
are somewhat higher, partly reflecting the broader country coverage. Indeed, the higher 
values are borne out by a direct comparison between the counterfactual predictions 
generated from the gravity model using 2SLS with time and country fixed effects and the 
corresponding values using least squares with time and country fixed effects, shown in 
Table 4b. Nevertheless, the main conclusions ensue.24 The decision to exit the EU rests 
with the UK and the consequences of that decision will be felt mainly by the UK.  
[Insert Table 4b here] 
Some caveats are in order. First, the parameter estimates for the EU trade related 
agreements and the associated counterfactual Brexit scenarios capture static trade effects 
 
24 A comparison of the results for the benchmark specification using the full sample period (Table 2, 
column 1) with the corresponding results using actual data only (Table 3, column 1) also shows somewhat 
higher EIA dummy coefficients using the latter, implying the counterfactual predictions are also likely to 
be higher.  
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only. In addition, the counterfactual trade policy predictions are only of short run 
duration. Ideally, an analysis of the trade consequences of Brexit would extend beyond 
the 2019-2022 period to match the UK’s long term membership of the EU since 1973.  
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) have previously suggested that the Brexit ‘shock’ 
could be transmitted through several channels over time, In the near term, bilateral trade 
would decline as the loss of unrestricted access to the Single Market and preferential 
access to third countries would entail higher tariffs and barriers. Heightened economic 
uncertainty would reduce confidence, potentially affecting the cost and availability of 
finance and the financing of the current account deficit via changes in capital flows. 
Migration incentives would also be affected with restrictions on the free movement of 
labour from the EU and a weaker UK economy after exit. By 2020, these effects could 
shave off 3 per cent of UK output (equivalent to GB£2,200 per household).   
In the longer term, structural changes could mean lower business investment 
brought about by lower foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from the EU. Less trade 
and investment would mean less openness and innovation and hence technical progress 
and productivity would be reduced. Less immigration could also affect the pool of skills 
as well as long term growth. By 2030, UK output could be more than 5 per cent smaller 
as a non EU member (ie between GB£3,200 and GB£5,000 per household depending on 
the central or pessimistic scenario). In a similar vein, Van Reenen (2016) suggests 
welfare losses of between 1.3 and 2.6 per cent depending on a soft or hard Brexit 
scenario, rising to between 6.3 and 9.5 per cent when productivity effects are 
incorporated in a dynamic model. 
Second, there is some uncertainty associated with the predicted values, for 
example, the gravity model predictions of trade values with the EU are much higher 
when compared with the WEO forecast values.25 
Third, the global Britain strategy is over optimistic and unrealistic; forging new 
trade deals with so many countries in such a short term horizon is not possible. Given 
their complexity, negotiating trade deals typically involves considerable time (to agree 
 
25 An incomplete set of data are available for the infrastructure variables, implying the predicted values for 
countries with missing infrastructure data – typically smaller countries – cannot be generated. The 
consequence is that the predicted values tend to be higher when compared with the WEO forecast data. 
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deep rather than shallow deals);26 personnel and expertise (largely absent in the UK until 
recently owing to its long term membership of the EU without any need to agree trade 
deals for itself); as well as trade offs (divergent rules between the US and the EU on 
genetically modified foods, for example, involve a choice between freer trade with the 
former versus the latter). Furthermore, a no deal outcome with the EU runs the risk that 
some countries may diversify trade away from the UK and redirect it towards the 
remaining EU member countries. 
Overall, the numbers suggest that retaining free trade deals with the EU and third 
countries is of greater priority than their forfeiture in favour of potential free trade with 
the rest of the world. Afterall, about half of the UK’s trade is conducted with its EU 
neighbouring countries27 with seven of its top ten trading partners belonging to the EU 
(see Figures 1 and 2). 
In the post Brexit era, the UK’s trade strategy will involve prioritising trade deals 
with some countries over others. The natural starting point is to agree a trade deal with 
the EU – the block of countries representing the UK’s largest and nearest trading partners 
– to ensure continued free trade and prevent the imposition of tariffs, barriers and checks 
on goods arriving into the UK. Rolling over existing trade deals with the EU, agreed 
while the UK was still a member, is also of paramount importance to avoid disruption for 
firms.28 Next up are trade deals with large countries such as the US, China, India and 
 
26 The depth of trade agreements can vary according to provisions relating to tariffs, services liberalisation, 
investment rules, standards, public procurement, competition, intellectual property rights and other 
measures capturing varying degrees of trade liberalisation. As part of future work, it would be interesting to 
also examine the depth of bilateral trade agreements. Bowen et al. (2010), for example, measure the degree 
of economic integration across a range of RTAs. For the entire set of PTAs in force and notified to the 
WTO, Hofmann et al. (2019) evaluate the changing scope of PTAs over time. Using the content of trade 
agreements to build a measure of depth based on the number of provisions covered by the agreement, 
Mulabdic et al. (2017) assess UK EU trade relations.  
27 For the year 2016, over 50 per cent of the UK’s imports come from the EU and over 47 per cent of its 
exports go to the EU (trade shares as a percentage of world total, IMF 2017).  
28 As of March 2020, 19 trade deals (Andean Community, CARIFORUM, Central America, Chile, Eastern 
and Southern Africa, Faroe Islands, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Morocco, 
Pacific states, Palestine, SADC, South Korea, Switzerland and Tunisia) have been rolled over and are 
expected to take effect at the end of the transition period.  
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Japan that would provide British exporters with access to large foreign markets and 
therefore, would likely yield greatest benefits from the UK’s perspective. Commonwealth 
countries – a group of 53 countries with current or historical colonial linkages to Britain – 
including Australia, Canada and New Zealand are also on the list of high priority trade 
deals.29 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Using the gravity model for a panel of bilateral imports between the EU15 and the rest of 
the world over the 1960-2022 period, the trade effects of EU economic integration 
agreements, their evolution over time and the related counterfactual Brexit trade policy 
scenarios are assessed. In distinguishing between the types of arrangements with the EU, 
opposing coefficient signs are found: positive for EU membership and the FTAs, but 
negative for the regional EPAs. The mixed results can largely be explained in terms of 
the degree of liberalisation and the concomitant reduction of tariff and non tariff barriers. 
Mapping the evolution of the trade effects of EU trade related agreements over 
five subperiods capturing different eras of major global shocks, the results suggest the 
positive coefficients of EU and FTA membership tend to diminish over time, implying 
earlier membership of EIAs came with greater trade benefits associated with the ‘four 
freedoms’ of the Single Market. The effects of EIAs are subdued in the subperiod since 
the global financial crisis and the debt crisis in Europe while the forecast subperiod 
suggests a rebound in the trade effect of EU membership. 
Finally, in generating the predicted values for the trade effects of three alternative 
counterfactual Brexit scenarios (hard Brexit, hard Brexit plus, global Britain), the 
findings suggest the UK’s trade with all three country groups (the EU, the FTAs and 
 
29 Shared beliefs in an international rules based system for trade and investment make comprehensive FTAs 
more likely with some countries. For example, negotiating trade deals with Canada and Japan (which 
already have trade agreements with the EU) or Australia and New Zealand (which are currently in 
negotiations with the EU) are likely to be less difficult when compared with China and India. The UK will 
also have to overcome challenges that have led to the suspension of EU trade talks with India and the US 
(see the Appendix Table A2). Rather than aiming to agree on a full scale FTA, one alternative might 
involve liberalising economic sectors that matter for the UK (eg financial services) without jeopardising 
other sensitive sectors (eg food standards in the agricultural sector or drugs prices in the health sector). 
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regional EPAs) would decline substantially, approximately by one third. At the same 
time, trade with the rest of the world would rise by nearly a half. In aggregate, UK 
bilateral trade with all countries would decline by 6 per cent and 13 per cent under the 
hard Brexit and the hard Brexit plus scenarios respectively, but these losses would be 
partially offset by the global Britain strategy (5 per cent). From the EU’s perspective, 
only minor percentage changes in bilateral trade are predicted under all three scenarios, 
suggesting an asymmetry of effect.  
Of course, the scenario outcomes depend intrinsically on the economic growth 
projections, which can change as the full consequences of Brexit become apparent and as 
economic conditions evolve. The results for the global Britain strategy also come with 
major caveats. What is clear is that a clean break with the EU’s single market and 
customs union is made difficult by more than 45 years of EU membership and 
intertwined regulatory and institutional practices. In the end, the choice comes down to 
the degree to which Britain aligns itself with the EU; closer to the EU akin to Norway 
plus (adding a customs union to membership of the single market); farther away based on 
the EU’s deal with Canada; or something in between modelled on the EU’s deep and 
comprehensive FTA with Ukraine, which would allow access to the single market, allow 
new deals with third countries and end free movement of people. There is a large range of 
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Table 1  EU import determinantsa 
 EU EIAs aggregated  EU EIAs disaggregated 
Regressors (1)b (2)c  (3)b (4)c 
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No. of obs 38 326 38 326  38 326 38 326 
2R  0.83 0.83  0.84 0.84 
Partial 2R d – 0.86  – 0.73 
Robust 
2  score teste – 61.75**  – 37.94** 
Robust regression F-teste – 60.40**  – 11.57** 
2  score testf  – 21.96**  – 26.70** 
a The t-statistics (z-statistics for 2SLS) in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. 
b Least squares estimation with time and country fixed effects.   
c 2SLS estimation with time and country fixed effects.  
d The first stage summary statistics in column (2) refer to the partial R2 for the model with one endogenous  
   EIA dummy and in column (4) refer to Shea’s (1997) partial R2 statistics (0.73, 0.47 and 0.76) associated  
   with multiple endogenous EIA dummies.      
e Tests of the null hypothesis that the EIA dummies are exogenous (Wooldridge 1995). 
f Test of overidentifying restrictions (Wooldridge 1995). 
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Road density (ln) – 
0.45** 
(8.03) 






































No. of obs 38 326 22 531 11 193 21 985 38 174 38 326 
2R  0.84 0.85 0.93 0.87 0.84 0.37 
a 2SLS estimation with time and country fixed effects.    
b The z-statistics in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. 
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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No. of obs 101 449 71 051 22 740 7 432 8 814 
2R  0.79 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.85 
a 2SLS estimation with time and country fixed effects.     
b The z-statistics in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust. 
















Table 4a  Counterfactual predictions (US$ million)a 











No Brexit      
WEO forecast 
value 
14 762 3 226 501 2 820 4 354 
Predicted value 27 715 2 484 738 2 913 9 040 
Predicted counterfactual value 
Hard Brexit  19 757 2 531 745 2 994 7 039 
Hard Brexit plus 20 339 1 778 522 3 063 7 054 
Global Britain 19 620 1 716 504 4 305 7 434 
Percentage change      
Hard Brexit  –29.83% 1.77% 1.17% 2.61% –6.02% 
Hard Brexit plus –27.81% –28.50% –28.76% 4.90% –12.80% 
Global Britain –30.41% –31.07% –31.20% 47.12% 5.48% 
Panel B EU–EU EU–FTA EU–EPA EU–ROW  EU–All 
No Brexit      
WEO forecast 
value 
8 147 994 90 941 1 927 
Predicted value 17 862 1 407 219 1 225 5 464 
Predicted counterfactual value 
Hard Brexit  17 906 1 415 219 1 242 5 485 
Hard Brexit plus 18 001 1 428 220 1 251 5 516 
Global Britain 17 891 1 418 218 1 234 5 478 
Percentage change      
Hard Brexit  0.12% 0.02% –0.10% 1.10% 0.58% 
Hard Brexit plus 0.56% 0.09% 0.46% 1.69% 1.18% 
Global Britain –0.17% 0.03% 0.29% 0.32% 0.18% 
a The counterfactual predictions, estimated for a panel of EU-ROW imports over the period 1980-2022 
using 2SLS with time and country fixed effects, are compared with the predicted values associated with 














Table 4b  Counterfactual predictions (US$ million)a 











No Brexit      
WEO forecast 
value 
14 762 3 226 501 2 820 4 354 
Predicted value 28 087 2 448 707 2 981 9 158 
Predicted counterfactual value 
Hard Brexit  21 294 2 487 715 3 043 7 447 
Hard Brexit plus 22 010 1 877 536 3 105 7 525 
Global Britain 21 762 1 848 526 4 021 7 881 
Percentage change      
Hard Brexit  –25.10% 1.60% 1.16% 1.98% –5.13% 
Hard Brexit plus –22.77% –23.41% –23.68% 3.93% –10.55% 
Global Britain –23.85% –24.73% –25.00% 34.25% 2.92% 
Panel B EU–EU EU–FTA EU–EPA EU–ROW  EU–All 
No Brexit      
WEO forecast 
value 
8 147 994 90 941 1 927 
Predicted value 18 106 1 396 210 1 252 5 537 
Predicted counterfactual value 
Hard Brexit  18 101 1 404 210 1 264 5 543 
Hard Brexit plus 18 215 1 413 210 1 274 5 578 
Global Britain 18 173 1 402 207 1 267 5 562 
Percentage change      
Hard Brexit  0.10% 0.36% 0.15% 0.77% 0.47% 
Hard Brexit plus 0.40% 0.66% 0.49% 1.40% 0.92% 
Global Britain –0.28% –0.33% –0.52% 0.65% 0.12% 
a The counterfactual predictions, estimated for a panel of EU-ROW imports over the period 1980-2022 
using least squares estimation with time and country fixed effects, are compared with the predicted values 














Fig 1  UK’s most important trading partner countries, 2016 (Import shares, % World) 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.  
 
Fig 2  UK’s most important trading partner countries, 2016 (Export shares, % World) 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.  
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Table A1  List of EU trade related agreements 
Country 
Date of entry 
into force 
Coverage Type of Agreement 
EU Membersa    
EEC-6  1 Jan 1958 Goods  EU member 
EC-9 1 Jan 1973 Goods EU member 
EC-10 1 Jan 1981 Goods EU member 
EC-12 1 Jan 1986 Goods EU member 
EC-15 1 Jan 1995 Goods and Services EU member 
EC-25  1 May 2004 Goods and Services EU member 
EC-27 1 Jan 2007 Goods and Services EU member 
EU-28 1 Jul 2013 Goods and Services EU member 
Customs Unions, Free Trade Agreements, Association Agreements, Stabilisation Agreements 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein  1 Jan 1973 Goods Free Trade Agreement 
Iceland  1 Apr 1973 Goods Free Trade Agreement 
Norway  1 Jul 1973 Goods Free Trade Agreement 
Syriab 1 Jul 1977 Goods Cooperation Agreement 
Andorra  1 Jul 1991 Goods  Customs Union 
Turkey  1 Jan 1996 Goods Customs Union 
Faroe Islands  1 Jan 1997 Goods Free Trade Agreement 
Palestine 1 Jul 1997  Goods Interim Association Agreement  
Tunisia  1 Mar 1998 Goods Association Agreement 
Morocco  1 Mar 2000 Goods Association Agreement 
Israel  1 Jun 2000 Goods Association Agreement 
Mexico  
1 Jul 2000 (G) 
1 Oct 2000 (S) 
Goods and Services 
Economic Partnership, Political  
   Coordination and Cooperation Agreement  
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Macedonia, FYR  
1 Jun 2001 (G) 
1 Apr 2004 (S) 
Goods and Services Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
San Marino  1 Apr 2002 Goods Customs Union 
Jordan  1 May 2002 Goods Association Agreement  
Chile  
1 Feb 2003 (G) 
1 Mar 2005 (S) 
Goods and Services Association Agreement, Additional Protocol 
Lebanon  1 Mar 2003 Goods Association Agreement 
Egypt  1 Jun 2004 Goods  Association Agreement  
Algeria  1 Sep 2005 Goods  Association Agreement  
Albania  
1 Dec 2006 (G) 
1 Apr 2009 (S) 
Goods and Services Stabilisation and Association Agreement  
Montenegro  
1 Jan 2008 (G) 
1 May 2010 (S) 
Goods and Services Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
1 Jul 2008 (G) 
1 Jun 2015 (S) 
Goods and Services Stabilisation and Association Agreement   
Serbia  
1 Feb 2010 (G) 
1 Sep 2013 (S) 
Goods and Services Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
Korea, Rep  1 Jul 2011 Goods and Services Free Trade Agreement 
Andean Communityc 1 Mar 2013 Goods and Services Comprehensive Trade Agreement 
Central Americad  1 Aug 2013 Goods and Services Association Agreement 
Georgia  1 Sep 2014 Goods and Services Association Agreement 
Moldova, Rep  1 Sep 2014 Goods and Services Association Agreement 
Ukraine 1 Jan 2016 Goods and Services 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade    
   Agreement 
Kosovo  1 Apr 2016 Goods Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
Canada 21 Sep 2017 Goods and Services 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade  
   Agreement  
Economic Partnership Agreements 
CARIFORUMe 29 Dec 2008 Goods and Services Economic Partnership Agreement 
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Pacific Statesf 20 Dec 2009 Goods Interim EPA 
Eastern and Southern Africag 14 May 2012 Goods Interim EPA 
Central Africah  4 Aug 2014 Goods  Interim EPA 
West Africai  3 Sep 2016 Goods  Economic Partnership Agreement 
Southern African  
   Development Communityj 
10 Oct 2016 Goods Economic Partnership Agreement 
Source: European Commission (2018); World Trade Organisation (2018).  
a The 15 established member countries of the EU include the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC), namely, Belgium, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and nine additional countries which gained entry under four rounds of enlargement when Denmark, Ireland and the 
UK joined the Economic Community (EC) in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986; and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The three more recent 
rounds of enlargement encompassing 13 new member states (NMS) include 10 countries that joined in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. 
b The ongoing conflict in Syria has led to the suspension of trade in some industries (crude oil, petroleum products, gold, precious metals and diamonds).  
c The provisional application of the agreement with Colombia and Peru began on 1 March 2013 and with Ecuador on 1 January 2017. Bolivia, also a member of the 
Andean Community, has the option to join the agreement in the future.  
d The Association Agreement entails three pillars, namely trade, cooperation and political dialogue with six Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. The trade pillar entered into provisional application with Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama on 1 August 2013, with 
Costa Rica and El Salvador on 1 October 2013 and with Guatemala on 1 December 2013.  
e The CARIFORUM EPA comprises 15 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. Ratification by Haiti is still pending. 
f The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with 14 Pacific countries (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). An interim EPA with Papua New Guinea and Fiji has been provisionally applied since 20 December 2009 and 
28 July 2014 respectively.  
g The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with 11 Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
the Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Four countries (Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Zimbabwe) have agreed an interim EPA.  
h The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with eight Central African countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe). An interim EPA with Cameroon entered into provisional application on 4 August 2014. 
i The EU initialled an EPA on 30 June 2014 with 16 West African states, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. An interim EPA with Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana entered into provisional application on 3 September 2016 and 15 December 
2016 respectively.  
j The agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been provisionally applied with five countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 





Table A2  List of EU trade related agreements pending, under negotiation and suspended 
Country Agreement 
Agreements pending  
Singaporea Free Trade Agreement 
Vietnamb Free Trade Agreement  
Japanc Economic Partnership Agreement  
Agreements under negotiation  
East African Communityd Economic Partnership Agreement 
Mercosure  Association Agreement 
Philippinesf  Free Trade Agreement 
Indonesiag Free Trade Agreement 
Australiah Free Trade Agreement 
New Zealandi Free Trade Agreement 
Agreements suspended  
Gulf Cooperation Councilj Free Trade Agreement 
Indiak  Free Trade Agreement 
Malaysial  Free Trade Agreement 
Thailandm Free Trade Agreement 
United Statesn  Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Source: European Commission (2018); World Trade Organisation (2018).  
a Negotiations for a comprehensive FTA with Singapore began in December 2009, were relaunched in 
March 2010 and were concluded on 17 October 2014. The Agreement is awaiting ratification. 
b Negotiations for a comprehensive FTA with Vietnam began in October 2012 and were concluded on 2 
December 2015. The Agreement is awaiting approval.   
c Negotiations for an EPA with Japan began on 25 March 2013; 19 rounds of talks were concluded on 8 
December 2017. The treaty is awaiting signature.  
d On 16 October 2014, the EU initialled an EPA with the East African Community (EAC), comprising five 
partner states (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda).  
e Negotiations for an Association Agreement with the four founding members of Mercosur (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) were relaunched in May 2010, were paused in 2012 and resumed in May 
2016.    
f Negotiations for a FTA with the Philippines began on 22 December 2015.  
g Negotiations for a FTA with Indonesia began on 1 September 2016; three rounds have been concluded. 
h Negotiations for a FTA with Australia were launched in June 2018. 
i Negotiations for a FTA with New Zealand were launched in June 2018. 
j Negotiations for a FTA with the six members of the GCC, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates, began in 1990, but were suspended in 2008.  
k Negotiations for a FTA with India began in 2007, but have stalled since 2012. 
l Negotiations for a FTA with Malaysia began in October 2010, but have stalled after 7 rounds of talks. 
m Negotiations for a comprehensive FTA with Thailand began in May 2013, but have stalled after 4 rounds 
of negotiations, coinciding with the military takeover of the country in April 2014.    
n Negotiations for the TTIP with the United States began in 2013, but after 15 rounds of talks, further 





Table A3  The UK’s evolving trade shares (% of World)a 
 Advanced economies  European Union  Emerging and developing countries  
 Import Share Export Share  Import Share Export Share  Import Share Export Share 
1950 57.64 61.11  26.23 28.00  40.64 38.73 
1955 64.21 62.83  28.46 30.47  35.25 36.96 
1960 65.18 64.32  30.67 30.99  34.52 35.25 
1965 66.59 69.46  33.84 39.06  33.11 30.05 
1970 70.95 72.00  38.09 42.16  28.61 27.11 
1975 70.86 68.25  45.46 42.96  27.72 30.10 
1980 79.95 74.23  49.87 53.37  19.75 25.12 
1985 86.42 81.27  55.28 54.86  13.16 18.39 
1990  88.79 84.21  58.31 58.33  10.52 14.93 
1995 84.22 80.93  52.82 56.07  11.95 15.20 
2000 79.23 85.66  49.73 58.61  16.62 13.19 
2005 71.76 80.32  51.08 55.07  21.01 16.12 
2010 69.11 75.80  48.02 51.36  26.07 20.33 
2016 72.75 75.93  50.25 47.30  25.82 22.32 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (2017), International Monetary Fund.  
 
 
 
